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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRC ' S CORRUPT CULTURE
INTRODUCTION
For decades the People ' s Republic of China (PRC)
has struggled with the problem of social and political
corruption within its borders (Chen , Li , & Otto 2002;
Tanner 1999) .

With strong international pressures and a

public demand for change , the PRC has engaged in various
reforms to curtail corruption.

Although there have been

positive steps to curtail corruption within the PRC,
corruption is still prevalent today .

Scholars argue that

corruption , within the PRC , has become embedded within
Chinese practices and have become customary throughout
the PRC . This dilemma often referred to as the PRC ' s
corrupt culture (Lee 2004 ; Degoyler & Scott 1996) .
GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION
Most notably , there is corruption among Chinese
governmental officials (Duncan 2002) .
governmental officials

include~ ,

Corruption among

but is not limited to ,

bribery , fraud , and misappropriation of government funds
{Duncan 2002) .

Governmental corruption is problematic

because it limits the government in functioning as a

1

vital source for social change by implementing effective
legislation and laws (He s s & Dun fee 2000) .
JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
The PRC ' s judic i a l system is made up of four levels
of courts (Peerenboom 2001 , 214 ; Tanner 1999 ; China Human

Rights 1999) : the Supreme People ' s Court (SPC) , Higher
People ' s court (HPC) , Intermediate People ' s Court (IPC) ,
and the Basic People ' s Court (BPC) .
Supreme
People's Court

I

Higher
People's Court

I

Intermediate
People's Court

I

Basic
People's Court
Figure 1 . THE PRC ' S JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Supreme People ' s Court , is one of the most important
governmental bodies and courts in the PRC (Halverson
2004).

However, the Supreme People ' s Court and other

Chinese courts are not exempt from the PRC ' s corrupt
culture.
2

Corruption within Chinese courts is commonly known
as judicial corruption (Yu, Chang, Cohen, et al. 2003;
Bulger 2000; Clarke 2003; Keyuan 2002; Hung 2004).

Judicial corruption in the PRC is not a new phenomenon.
It dates back for several decades and may come in various
forms.

These include, but not limited to, bribery,

misappropriation of governmental funds, and the
acceptance of "gifts" from the parties involved or the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

(Clarke 2003; Keyuan 2002).

As a result of the demand for change from the
Chinese populace, judicial officials, and international
community, the PRC has taken measures to curtail judicial
corruption.

In 2002, the PRC issued a judicial code of

ethics to prevent judicial corruption (Chow 2003, 37),
but judicial corruption is still rampant throughout the
PRC (Jianghua & Guanghua 2004; Chow 2003).
Some Chinese judicial officials have even publicly
taken an anti-judicial corruption stance (Jianghua &
Guanghua 2004, 393}.

Even with these public

acknowledgements and the enactment of the judicial codes
of ethics, bribery and other forms of

judici~l

corruption

continue to exist throughout the PRC (Hung 2004, 105).
The continuance of judicial

corrupti~n,

in the PRC, may

be a result of institutional flaws associated with the
3

inadequacies underlying the PRC ' s Constitution (Lin 2003 ,
220 J.
Another factor for judicial corruption may be
associated with the low pay scale and low prestige of
judicial positions . Chinese courts are thus dependent on
the financial resources of the local government .

This

inadvertently makes Chinese courts susceptible to
governmental influences and pressures (Folsom 1992 ; Lin
2003 ; Chow 2003) .

Additionally , the Supreme People ' s

Court and other Chinese courts have limited enforcement
and interpretation powers .

The vagueness of Chinese

laws , in turn , provides judges , local governmental
officials and administrators with the opportunity to
construe laws and regulations in a manner that will serve
their personal interests (Lee 2004 , 980) .
Finally , the close nexus between the Chinese
government and judiciary may be an important factor in
explaining judicial corruption in the PRC (Lee 1997 ,
xvi) .

Chinese judicial officials must report to the

People ' s Congress (Peerenboom 2001 , 294) .
Congress has the power to remove judges
214) .

The People ' s

(Pee~enboom

2001 ,

Chinese courts ' dependency to the local

governments , as well as , the People ' s Congress authority
to remove judges , is ultimately damaging to the autonomy

4

of the PRC's judicial system (Peerenboom 2001, 214).
This leaves some scholars to view Chinese courts as a
bureaucratic organ "and judges as government
administrators or bureaucrats." (Peerenboom 2001, 161).
This makes Chinese judges and courts impartial and more
of an instrument susceptible to governmental influence.
Governmental influence and interference further
undermines the possibility of judicial independence
within Chinese courts (Williams 2001), demoralizes publi c
confidences (Keyuan 2002), and makes it difficult, if not
impossible to enforce judicial awards (Lubman 1999;
Clarke 2003).

Governmental influence and interference is

problematic because government officials have substantial
power to use bribes or corrupt practices to advance their
personal agendas within the Chinese judiciary.
The extent that judicial corruption still plagues
the PRC's courts cannot be easily ascertained (Hung 2004,
106).

However, an "[o]fficial report [states] that

approximately 7,500 judges and other employees in China
were punished for violating laws or disciplinary rules
from 1998 to 2003" (Hung 2004, 106).

It

~annot

be

readily determined whether or not such punishments
include, or were the result of,
2004, 106).
5

judicial corruption (Hung

REGULATIONS & JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
The PRC has tried to implement new rules and
regulations to curtail corruption.

However, many of

these regulations were unsuccessful.

Consequently, some

Chinese citizens still perceive judicial corruption as a
serious problem (Hung 2004, 107).

Yet some regulations

have enabled the PRC to reestablish confidence among the
Chinese populace (Hung 2004, 112-113).
For instance, approximately 89% of senior Chinese
officials are confident about the on-going political and
judicial reforms, and feel that such reforms are
"(p]roperly handling the relation between the (Communist
Party] and government" (Survey; Nov. 29, 2004).

One must

critically examine the validity of these statistics and
acknowledge that the reforms were primarily implemented
to reduce the intermingling of the Communist Party with
local government and Cninese judicial officials.

Such

statistical analysis, given by the Communist Party or
Chinese officials, may be influenced by other variables
such as corruption.

According to Jian An, a former

Chinese official, "[a]s long as . . . absolute leadership
[is held] by the Communist Party, there can be no
progress in democracy" and legal reforms (Holley; June 2,
1992) .
b

THE PRC'S WTO MMBERSHIP & JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
The PRC's accession to the WTO is often viewed as an
additional incentive for the PRC to curtail judicial
corruption.

Providing an independent judicial system is

a requirement for all signatory nation-states to the WTO
(Lin 2003).

Thus, it is important for the PRC to

minimize governmental interference with its judiciary if
it seeks to maintain its WTO membership (Lin 2003).
Scholars remain skeptical about the PRC's ability to
comply with WTO regulations.

One criticism among scholars is that the Chinese
government and judiciary is so intertwined that judicial
independence .is almost nonexistent.

In fact, a majority

of Chinese judges are members of the Communist Party
(Hung 2004, 122), which leaves judges susceptible to
governmental influence and ultimately the PRC's corrupt
culture (Zhang 2002).

"While Article 5 of the [Chinese]

Constitution states that no one is above the law, in
practice the will of the Communist Party prevails over
the rule of law" (Lee 2004, 982-983) .

Thus, many foreign

parties are still skeptical about litigating in Chinese
courts.

7

CHAPTER II

ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATING IN CHINESE COURTS
INTRODUCTION
An alternative to litigating in Chinese courts is to
resolve foreign or international disputes through the

PRC's alternative dispute resolution systems (Synder
2001).

Alternative dispute resolution in the PRC comes

in three main forms:
arbitration.

mediation, conciliation, and

Research indicates that the Chinese have a

preference for mediation, but arbitration is the most
common form of dispute resolution involving international
parties.

Mediators, conciliators, and arbitrators
impartiality and neutrality are essential to the PRC's
alternative dispute resolution system.

Additionally,

these third party neutrals must remain independent from
other governmental bodies and governmental influence.
However, this is not always the case in practice.

MEDIATION
Parties use mediation in order to preserve privacy
(Folsom 1992).

Mediation in the PRC is often placed in

two categories: informal (people's mediation) and formal
8

(judicial mediation)

(Folsom 1992; Peerenboom 2002) .

The central problem concerning informal mediation is that
the decisions are not enforceable within Chinese courts.
In addition, informal mediation {people's mediation) is

susceptible to social and political pressures (Folsom
1992).
Formal mediation agreements, however, may be binding
within Chinese courts.

The Chinese government and

judicial officials usually encourage people to mediate
rather than litigating in Chinese courts (Lee 1997).
Furthermore, Chinese courts often refer parties to formal
mediation prior to the commencement of any litigation
proceedings.
The popularity of mediation can also be coupled with
a history of mediators pressuring participants of
conforming to the mediators' recommendations.

In post-

revolutionary China, for instance, Mao Zedong used the
PRC's mediation system to mobilize the Chinese populace
to conform to the Chinese Communist Party's initiatives
(Folsom 1992).

Such measures made Chinese mediators

susceptible to governmental influence

and ~ co~ruption.

Today, some mediators still pressure parties to conform
to their recommendations (Folsom 1992/.

9

It is debatable

whether or not this is due to Party initiatives or for
mediators to personally ''save face . "

CONCILIATION

We must distinguish conciliation from mediation.

Although both conciliation and mediation, in theory,
involve neutral third parties , conciliators have little
power to make recommendations for settlements (Folsom
1992).

In cases involving international parties,

conciliation is sometimes used in conjunction with
arbitration proceedings (Onyema 2001 , 413 - 414).
Conciliation may be conducted at any point of the

arbitration proceeding , unless an arbitration award is
Thus , conciliation is

rendered {Onyema 2001 , 414) .

treated as part of the arbitration proceedings and is
recorded accordingly (Onyema 2001 ,

414) .

Successful

conciliations result in the signing of an agreement known
as a conciliation agreement (Onyema 2001 , 413-414).
There are some disadvantages to conciliation
agreements .

First , conciliation agreements lack res

judicata (Onyema 2001 , 414) .

The doctrine of res

judicata would prevent an award or agreement from being

reargued in Chinese courts (Blacks Law Dictionary 1996,
1306) .

"It is (also] doubtful if a conciliation
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agreement executed by the arbitral tribunal would qualify
as a final award for purposes of recognition and
enforcement under the New York Convention" (Onyema 2001 ,
414) .

Some scholars are even skeptical about the

enforceability of conciliation agreements within Chinese
courts (Folsom 1992) .
Additionally , Chinese governmental departments and
officials can carry out conciliation proceedings (Cheng
1996 , 291) .

This is problematic because Chinese

governmental departments and officials may use
conciliations to advance their own personal objectives.
As a result of international concern of governmental
entanglement with conciliations , the PRC created a
centralized conciliation center in 1987 .

This center is

called the Beijing Conciliation Center (Cheng 1996 , 291) .
However , the PRC lacks laws that regulate conciliations
or conciliator ' s behaviors .

The PRC also fails to

penalize conciliators who accept bribes , from local
governmental officials or individual parties, or who
engage in other corrupt practices .
conciliations within the PRC an easy
governmental abuse .

11

This makes
targ~t

for

ARBITRATION
Arbitration is almost exclusively used to resolve
disputes involving international parties within the PRC
(Pattison 2003 , 503 ; Mo 2001 , 21).

There are numerous

advantages to using arbitration rather than litigation in
the PRC.

First, parties can avoid the corrupt culture

underlying the PRC ' s judicial and political
infrastructure .

Thus , arbitral independence and

impartiality is important to Chinese arbitration systems
(Hu 2001 , 22) .
Secondly , arbitration is a private , expedient, and
cost efficient process to resolve international disputes
(Martin 1997, 969).

However , corruption and ineffective

procedures and laws may impede on the PRC ' s alternative
dispute resolution systems ' ultimate goal - of providing
parties a fair , reliable , and effective alternative to
litigation.

CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION

THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN THE PRC
A brief examination of the PRC's history is
important to understand how the PRC ' s arbitration systems

12

are inst i tutiona l ized today (Mo 2001 , 7) .

The PRC has

endured centuries of social unrest and has struggled to
maintain a " rule of law" within it s legal s ystem
(Hamilton 2002) .

Such unrest motivated the Chinese

populace to develop alternatives to litigat i ng in Chinese
courts (Hamilton 2002) .
From early Confucius teachings , the Chinese populace
sought to resolve their disputes outside the Chinese
legal system (Mo 2001 , 1) .

The PRC has now become well

known for its extensive mediation and arbitration
history .

The history of mediation and arbitration within

in the PRC is often referred to i nterchangeably .

This is

because " [m)ediation and arbitration were
indistinguishab l e in anc i ent China"

(Mo 2001 , 7) .

Consequently we cannot find an equivalent
translation for the term we now consider ' arbitration '
ancient Chinese history .

in

The discussion of the history

or development of arbitration , thus , presupposes a
discussion of the history of mediation in the PRC (Mo
2001 , 7) .

It was not until the twentieth century when

the PRC used the expression ' zhongcai ,' the Western
equivalent to ' arbitration '

(Mo 2001 , 7 - 8 ; Hamilton 2002 ,

10) .
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The expression ' tiaojie ,' which is often referred to
as the Western equivalent to mediation , was the dominant
term used to describe ancient Chinese alternative dispute
resolution .

This supports the thought that the history

of meditation and arbitration were indistinguishable (Mo
2001 , 8) .

" However , given the importance of definition,

the history of arbitrat i on i n China large l y depends on
the understandings of the meaning of arbitration and
mediation in the ancient China "

(Mo 2001 , 8).

In its early development of alternative dispute
resolution , the PRC lacked specified rules and
regulations to govern mediation and arbitration .

Without

such regulations , it was easy for the Chinese government
to use its alternative dispute resolution systems to
advance their personal or internal goals .

In post -

revolutionary China , for instance , mediators often served
the interests of the Communist Party (Folsom 1992) .

The

Communist Party merely sought to mobilize support for the
ideological views of the Communist Party , rather than the
interests of the participants involved (Mo 2001 , 19) .
Mao Zedong , for instance , readily used the PRC ' s
mediation system to mobilize the Chinese populace to
conform to the Communist Party ' s initiatives (Folsom
1992) .

Chinese alternative dispute resolution systems
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merely an authoritarian tool for the government to
regulate the views of populace (McConnaughay 1999 , 504) .
During the 1920s the Communist Party adopted the
PRC ' s first arbitration and mediation law .

It was known

as the Charter of Peasant ' s Association of Juqian
(Charter)

(Duncan 2002) .

" Article 5 of the Charter

stated that disputes between members were to be
arbitrated or mediated by the committee member in charge
of arbitration or mediation , and that serious cases
should be arbitrated and mediated by the committee"
2001 , 19) .

(Mo

Within the Charter , the Communist Party was

authorized to establish the arbitration and mediation
committees (Mo 2001 , 20) .

This is problematic because of

widespread corruption within the Communist Party itself .

CHAPTER IV

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PRC ' S INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION SYSTEMS

DEFINING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Parties frequently include international arbitration
clauses in contractual agreements .

In order to

understand international arbitration one must first be
familiar with the term

' arbitration.~

ways to define arbitration .

There are numerous

Arbitration can be defined
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as another form of " adjudication " (Davis 1998 , 259).

In

addition , arbitration can be characterized as a
formalized dispute resolution process where an authorized
neutral third party renders a binding and finalized
decision in order to resolve the parties ' disputes (Harer
1999 , 393) .
International arbitration , in turn , may also be
broadly defined as an alternative and efficient method
for parties to resolve their disputes (Harer 1999, 393).
The definition of the term ' international ' may also vary
depending on what statute , treaty, choice of law , or
legal system the parties contractually agree to govern
the arbitration proceeding (Carbonneau 2003 , 1190) .
For example , the UNCITRAL Model Law " defines
arbitration as international if ' the parties to an
arbitration agreement have , at the time of the conclusion
for that agreement , their places of business in different
States '

(Article 1 ( 3)

)"

(Fishburne 1997 , 309) .

The

French N. C. P . C . defines international arbitration to
include anything that implicates international commerce
(Park 1999, 823) .

Yet , other nation- states fail to

differentiate between domestic or international
arbitrations (Park 1999 , 822) .

16

International Arbitration in the PRC , is not
explicitly defined (Fishburne 1997 , 311 ; Wang 2000 , 19).
Instead , we must refer to the 1995 China Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules.
This is also known as the 1995 CIETAC Arbitration Rules .
The 1995 CIETAC Arbitration Rules states that the term
' international, ' or ' foreign - related ,' arbitration
involves :
economic , trade and other disputes, whether
international or foreign related contractual or noncontractual , between foreign legal persons and/or
natural persons and Chinese legal persons and/or
natural persons , between Chinese foreign legal
persons and/or natural persons , and between Chinese
legal and/or natural persons in order to protect
legitimate rights and interests of the parties
concerned and promote the development of domestic
and foreign economic relations and trade .
(Fisherburne 1997 , 311 - 312) .
This definition indicates that the PRC defines
international arbitration broadly to include disputes
arising out of a contractual agreement involving a
foreign parties or entities .
There are some general disadvantages to
international arbitration within the PRC .

~

A well-

recognized disadvantage is that international arbitration
is generally unfettered or unregulatea .

Secondly ,

arbitrators are often immune from lawsuits and lack

17

regulations that dictate their professional conduct
(Carbonneau 2003 , 1201) .

Furthermore , it is difficult,

or even impossible , to appeal or reverse an arbitration
ruling . Thus , parties should become aware and understand
not only the laws and regulations regarding arbitrating
in the PRC , but also other variables that may affect the
enforceability of such arbitral awards against local
Chinese entities .

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WITHIN THE PRC
Unlike many other countries , institutionalized
arbitration has been in existence within the PRC for
nearly forty - nine (49) years .

The PRC ' s first

international arbitration system dates back to the mid 1950s (Qiu 2000 , 608) .

The PRC ' s Council for the

Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) established its
first arbitration commission in 1956 , called the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission tFTAC)

(Qiu 2000 , 608) .

In 1980 , the FTAC was renamed the Foreign Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC)

(Qiu 2000, 608) .

The FETAC was subsequently identified as the _ China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) in 1988 (Qiu 2000 , 608) .

Since the

establishment of the CIETAC and CMAC , in the mid- 1950s ,

18

arbitration has become the primary means for resolving
disputes in which involve foreign parties (Mo 2001, 22).
The CIETAC has adopted another name on October 1, 2000,

the Court of Arbitration of China Chamber of
International Commerce (CCOIC)

(Qiu 2000, 608).

The

terms CIETAC and CCIC have been used interchangeably (Qiu
2000, 608).

For purpose of this thesis, I will refer to

the latter as CIETAC.

CHINA CHAMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE (CCOIC)
Research indicates that the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade's (CCPIT) relationship
with the PRC'.s arbitration systems was quite influential.
The CCPIT was considered the empowering body of the PRC's
arbitration systems (Hu 2001, 14-15).

The CCPIT has the

authority to establish domestic and foreign-related
arbitration commissions.

Yet, it has only established

two arbitration commissions:

the China International

Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and
the China Maritime Arbitration . Commission {CMAC)
2001, 14-5).

{Hu

In 1988, the CCPIT was renamed the China

Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC) and has
maintained the role as China's liaison per se for
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disputes arising out of international commerce (Dejun ,
Moser , & Wang 1995) .
The CCOIC is the main body of the arbitration
commissions .

With the authorization of the CCOIC , and

the Chinese Arbitration Law , the Chinese Arbitration
Commission (Arbitration Commission) was created (Dejun ,
Moser , & Wang 2000 , 11) .

The Arbitration Commission was

officially established , in 1994 , to formulate rules and
regulations for Arbitration Commissions throughout the
PRC (Pattison & Herron 2003 , 503).
The Arbitration Commission , in theory , is
independent from the Chinese Communist Party (Brown &
Rogers 1997 , 338) .

Accordingly , the Arbitration

Commission is seen as " a non - governmental , selfregulating organization of the Arbitration Commission"
(Brown & Rogers 1997 , 338) .

However , whether the

Arbitration Commission . acts as an independent entity in
practice is debated among scholars (Brown & Rogers 1997;
Claver- Carone 2002) .
The CCOIC ' s authority expanded with the
implementation of the PRC ' s 1994 Arbitration_ Law (ClaverCarone 2002 , 378 - 379).

" The 1994 Arbitration Law

authorized the [CCOIC] to organize and establish foreignrelated arbitration commissions in addition to local
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commissions "

(Claver- Carone 2002 , 378 ; Hu 2001 , 14) .

The

1994 Arbitration Law is silent on whether or not these
local arbitration commissions are authorized to accept
foreign - related or international disputes (Claver- Carone
2002 , 379 ; Hu 2001 , 15) .
The General Off ice of the State Council provided
some clarifications to this problem when it issued the
1996 Notice on Several Issues that Need to be Clarified
in Order to Implement the Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China t " 1996 Notice " )
379) .

t Claver- Carone 200 2 ,

The 1996 Notice stated that these local

arbitration commissions were allowed to accept both
foreign - related and domestic disputes (Claver - Carone
2002 , 379 ; Hu 2001 , 15) .
Since 2002 , the CCOIC has organized approximately 401
local arbitration commissions (Claver - Carone 2002 , 379) .
However , the PRC has failed to create specific rules
and regulations to supervise the enforceability of
foreign - related or international awards within these
local arbitration commissions (Claver - Carone 2002r 379).
In addition , there are no ethical or administrative
provisions that monitor whether local arbitrators are
susceptib l e or influenced by local governmental officials
or susceptible to the PRC ' s corrupt culture .
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FRAMEWORK OF THE CHINESE ARBITRATION COMMISSIONS
The Arbitration Cormnission is comprised of one
Chairman , several Vice-Chairman , a Secretary- General , and
a Secretariat (Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett, LLP 2003 ,
A8) .

CCOIC
Chinese Arbitration Commission (CAC)

Chairman of thP. CAC
Vic:P. - Chairman!s\ of thP. CAC
SP.crP.tarv GP.nP.ral of thP. CAC
SP.c:rP.t<'l.ri<'l.t of thP. C:AC:
Figure 2. COMPOSITION OF THE CHINESE
CHAMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE

The Chairman of the Arbitration Cormnission the
responsible for making sure that the arbitration
proceeding is consistent with the CIETAC Rules {Simpson ,
Thacher , & Barlett , LLP 2003 , A6) .

The Vice - Chairman ' s

duties are limited to the delegated duties vested to them
by the Chairman of the Arbitration Cormnission .

The

Chairman of the Arbitration Cormnission may authorize the
Vice-Chairman to perform the functions undeE the
Chairman ' s duties (Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett, LLP 2003,
A6) .

The Secretary- General monitors the duties of the

Secretariat (Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett , LLP 2003, A6).
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The Arbitration Corrunission ' s Secretariat is
responsible for examining all applications for
arbitration within the CIETAC (Simpson , Thacher , &
Barlett , LLP 2003 , A7).

After a through examination of

the application for arbitration the Secretariat will , if
the application is completed properly, send both parties
of the dispute a notice of Arbitration along with a copy
of the CIETAC Rules , Arbitration Fee Schedule , and Panel
of Arbitrators (Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett , LLP 2003 ,
A7) .

CHINA ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION (CIETAC)
The Chinese Chamber of International Corrunerce
{formerly CCPIT) established the CIETAC in 1956 (Hamilton
2002) .

The CIETAC has become one of the most utilized

international commercial arbitration commissions in the
world (Perez 2000, 494 ; Pattison & Herron 2003, 503;
Martin 1997 , 968).

"In 1985 , the . . . CIETAC heard only

37 disputes ; in 1995 it handled nearly 1000" (Synder
2001 , 440).

The popularity 0£ the CIETAC can be

associated with its respective jurisdictional
requirements (Dejun , Moser , & Wang 2000 , 11) .

The CIETAC

handles a broad range of international and foreign23

related disputes including trade , maritime , and economic
disputes (Fisherburne 1997 , 311 - 312) .
The CIETAC ' s popularity can also be linked with the
fact that it is one of the only institutionalized
alternatives that foreign parties have to litigating in
Chinese courts .

Additionally, the CIETAC ' s popularity

can be associated with the presumed benefits in choosing
arbitration over litigating in Chinese courts .

The

CIETAC provides parties with procedural flexibility.
Thus , stringent rules of evidence and procedural
formalities (e.g . preliminary meetings) , like in some
Western arbitration systems , may not be applicable in the
CIETAC ' s arbitration proceedings (Dejun , Moser ,
2000 , 14) .

& Wang

Foreign parties can agree to conduct

arbitration proceedings in languages other than Mandarin
or Cantonese Chinese (Martin 1997 , 968 ; Dejun , Moser , &
Wang 2000 , 13) .

In addition , the CIETAC often renders

awards with a comparatively expedient time frame
Moser , & Wang 2000 , 14}.

(Dejun,

Furthermore , CIETAC proceedings

are often less expensive than litigating in Chinese
courts (Dejun , Moser , & Wang 2000 , 14) .
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SELECTION OF CIETAC ARBITRATORS
Another benefit to the CIETAC is that parties have
the ability to actually select the arbitrators to preside
over the CIETAC arbitration proceedings.

The CIETAC

arbitration proceeding may be composed of either a panel
of three arbitrators or a single arbitrator (Dejun,
Moser, & Wang 2000, 21) from the Chinese Arbitration
Commission (Simpson, Thacher, & Barlett, LLP 2003, A9).
When a panel of three arbitrators is chosen, each party
selects an arbitrator they wish to preside over their
CIETAC arbitration proceedings (Simpson, Thacher, &
Barlett, LLP 2003, A9).

Then the parties must jointly

agree on the selection of the third arbitrator.
If the parties fail to select a third arbitrator
within twenty days after receiving notice of the CIETAC
arbitration proceedings (Simpson, Thacher, & Barlett, LLP
2003, A9), then the Chairman of the Arbitration
Commission is entrusted with the authority to appoint a
third arbitrator.

This is true even when the parties

fail to give the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission
such powers (Simpson, Thacher, & Barlett,- LLP 2003, A9A10).
Although the opportunity to appoint arbitrators to
preside over the CIETAC arbitration proceedings exists,
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the main authority to appoint an arbitrator for the
CIETAC still lies within the CCOIC (Dejun , Moser , & Wang
1995) .

This is because the ultimate CCOIC has the

authority to appoint arbitrators to the Chinese
Arbitration Corom.ission (Dejun , Moser , & Wang 2000) .
Parties , in turn , are limited to the Chinese Arbitration
Commission in their arbitrator selection process .
The relationship between the CIETAC and the CCOIC
may go even further .
Chinese officials .

Members of the CCOIC are often
These Chinese officials may

simultaneously hold , for instance , a Vice Chairman
position within the CCOIC and also be the presiding
arbitrator over a CIETAC arbitration proceeding.

This

is problematic because Chinese officials have a long
history of corruption , deceptive practices , and
governmental influence (Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett , LLP
2003 , A6) .

Furthermore , it is debatable whether or not

they can remain neutral throughout the arbitration
proceedings if the parties decide to challenge the
authority of the arbitrator .

However , some scholars

indicate that even though this close

relati~nship

exists

between the CCOIC and the PRC ' s arbitration system , they
contend that arbitrators can still act independently in
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spite of potential influences from the CCOIC (Dejun ,
Moser , & Wang 1995).

CHINA MARITIME ARBITRATION COMMISSION (CMAC)
The PRC increasingly emerged as a major maritime
nation-state (Hamilton 2002) .

Consequently , the PRC

faced international pressures to provide regulations to
protect foreign traders .

As a result , in 1952 , the PRC

attempted to draft and implement its first maritime law.
This attempt was unsuccessful .

Consequently , it took

nearly forty years to enact its first maritime law
(Hamilton 2002) .
In the meantime , CCOIC established the Maritime
Arbitration Commission (MAC) in 1958 to strengthen
foreign confidence in the Chinese maritime industry
(Hamilton 2002 ; Peerenboom 2000 ,

5) .

In 1988 , the MAC

was renamed the China Maritime Arbitration Commission
(CMAC) .

The CMAC ' s jurisdiction is limited to maritime

law or disputes (Hamilton 2002) .

However , the CMAC does

not have e x clusive jurisdiction over maritime disputes
because " CIETAC and local arbitration
permitted to hear maritime cases"

comlni~sions

are

(Hamilton 2002 ) .

The CMAC is comprised of approximately ninety-one
(91) arbitrators (Peerenboom 2000 , 6) , who are
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knowledgeable about maritime disputes and laws
2002 J •

(Hamilton

Its caseload is relatively smaller than the

CIETAC (Carbonneau 2002, 789).

This may be a result of

the limitations to the CMAC's jurisdiction, "averaging
only fifteen to twenty-five cases per yearn (Peerenboom
2002, 6).

Although the CMAC hears a relatively small

number of cases, this does not determine the wide-range
of issues arising out of maritime contracts.

Such

disputes include, but are not limited to, bills of laden,
marine insurance, pollution, towage, sales, repairs,
building and dismantling vessels, contracts for fuel, and
labor (Hamilton 2002).

CHAPTER V
THE RULES GOVERNING ARBITRATIONS IN THE PRC
THE CHINESE ARBITRATION LAW
Prior to 1994, the PRC lacked a regulatory or
monitoring scheme for arbitration proceedings that
involved international or foreign parties (Wang 1996, 6;
Liu & Lourie 1995, 540; Hu 2003).

"Rather, arbitration

appeared to be regulated by a combination of central
government decrees, statutes, referring to arbitration,
regulations enacted by arbitration authorities, and

28

common practice "

(Liu & Lourie 1995 ,

540) .

On August 31 ,

1994 , the National People ' s Congress enacted the PRC ' s
first arbitration legis l ation , known as the Chinese
Arbitration Act (Hu 2003) .

This Act is also known as the

Chinese Arbitration Law (Wang 1996 , 11) .
The Chinese Arbitration Law brought instrumental
changes to the stru cture of the PRC ' s Arbitration
Commissions (Dejun 2000 , 7 ; Brown & Rogers 1997 , 338 ;
Wang 1996 , 11) .

The Chinese Arbitration Law provided a

basic framework for both domestic and international
arbitrations (Dejun , Moser ,

& Wang 2000 , 7) .

CHAPTER 7

and Articles 66 through 73 of the Chinese Arbitration Law
provide special provisions that pertain only to foreign related or international arbitrations
Wang 2000 , 15) .
Law ,

(Dejun, Moser ,

&

Article 66 of the Chinese Arbitration

for example , indicates that the China Chamber Of

International Commerce. (CCOIC) may establish a commission
of arbitrators when foreign concerns or foreign parties
are involved within the arbitration proceeding
(Arbitration Law , last visited Mar . 12 , 2005) .
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CIETAC ARBITRATION RULES
The 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Rules

(modification of

the 1995 CIETAC Arbitration Rules) were formed in
accordance with the Chinese Arbitration Law (Simpson,
Thacher , & Barlett , LLP 2003, A4) .

Prior to the 1998

CIETAC Arbitration Law , the PRC ' s jurisdiction was quite
limited to economic disputes .

The 1998 CIETAC

Arbitration Rules legitimizes the CIETAC ' s expansive
jurisdiction.

Article 2 of the 1998 CIETAC Arbitration

Rules provides:
China International Economic and Trade Commission
[CIETAC] . . . independently and impartially
resolves , by means of arbitration , disputes arising
from international or foreign - related , contractual
or non-contractual , economic and trade transactions .
The disputes stated in the proceeding paragraph
include : (l} international and foreign - related
disputes ;
(Dejun , Moser , & Shangcheng 2000 , 559) .
The 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Law enables the CIETAC to
arbitrate expansive foreign - related cases .
The 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Rules also explains the
application process , proceedings , defenses , notices, and
the authority of the Chinese Arbitration
or Arbitration Commission) .

~ommission

(CAC

Article 3 of the 1998 CIETAC

Arbitration Rules indicates that the Arbitration
Commission will accept cases

~ upon
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the written

application by one of the parties "

(Simpson , Thacher, &

Barlett , LLP 2003 , A5-A7).
If a party disputes the validity of the arbitration
agreement or the jurisdiction of the CIETAC , the 1998
CIETAC Arbitration Rules gives the Arbitration Commission
authority to determine the validity of the issue at hand
(Simpson , Thacher , & Barlett , LLP 2003 , AS) .

The 1998

CIETAC Arbitration Rules are consistent with other
international arbitration systems .

Under the ad- hoc

arbitration rules , found in the UNCITRAL Model Law, an
arbitral tribunal or arbitration commission may provide
rulings in cases regarding its own jurisdiction ,
" including any objections with respect to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement '

(Bowman 2000,

144) . Likewise , the 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Rules allow
the Chinese Arbitration Commission , who ' s members may
also be arbitrating tne case , to rule on its own
jurisdiction .
This is quite controversial among scholars .

Some

fear that arbitrators may not be able to remain neutral
if they conduct dual roles throughout the arbitration
(e.g . arbitrator and decision - maker of jurisdiction) .
Secondly , some president arbitrators-may be self-
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interested (e . g . bribes) in the case and should not be
able to decide their own jurisdiction .

Parties may contractually agree to modify the 1998
CIETAC Arbitration Rules in which their dispute may be
arbitrated .

This allows parties an avenue to avoid

challenges to arbitrator impartiality by limiting members
of their arbitration panel from deciding jurisdictional
issues .

Article 7 of the 1998 CIETAC Arbitration Rules

states :
If the parties agree to submit their disputes to the
Arbitration Commission for arbitration , it will be
taken that they have agreed to the case being
arbitrated under these Rules . However , if the

parties have agreed otherwise , and subject to
consent by the Arbitration Commission , the parties'
agreement will prevail .

(Simpson , Thacher , Barlett , LLP 2003 , AS)

added) .

(emphasis

However , the parties ' agreement is subject to the
approval of the Arbitration Commission .

Since the

parties ' agreement is subject to the consent of the
Arbitration Commission , it is uncertain whether or not
the parties ' agreement to revise the CIETAC Arbitration
Rules would be honored .

One must further scrutinize the

language of Article 7 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules .
In order to modify the CIETAC Arbitration Rules a party

must not only demonstrate that there was an agreement
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among the parties , but also obtain the consent of the
Arbitration Commission in order for that agreement to be
honored .

This places a heavy , and possibly unobtainable ,

burden on parties who seek to modify the CIETAC
Arbitration Rules .

COMBINING ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
Arbitration , within the PRC , is sometimes combined
with conciliation .

Article 46 of the 1998 CIETAC

Arbitration Rules provides :
If both parties have a desire for conciliation or
one party so desires and the other party agrees to
it when consulted by the arbitration tribunal, the
arbitration tribunal may conciliate the case under
its cognizance in the process of arbitration .
(Mei-fun 1998 , xxii ; Bakovic 1999 , 114).
If the conciliation is successful , then a conciliation
agreement is made (Bakovic 1999 , 116) .

Then the CIETAC

arbitrator will write an arbitration award in accordance
with the conciliation agreement . (Bakovic 1999 , 116).
The arbitration presides over both the arbitration and
conciliation proceedings .
" The crucial question is ,

' How does the same person

act both as [conciliator] and arbitrator in the same
dispute without offending these rules of due process? "
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(Onyema 2001, 416 - 417) .

Many scholars believe that it is

difficult to maintain neutrality when presiding over the
same dispute while acting in diverse roles (Onyema 2001 ,
416-417).

The same is true if a Chinese judge was

presiding over a case and decided to send the dispute to
mediation .

The Chinese judge , in turn , should not play

the role of the mediator due to fear of that the judge
will not remain neutral throughout both proceedings.
This example can also be applied in cases where an
arbitrator serves in multiple roles (e . g. conciliator ,
trier- of- fact) because the arbitrator may incorporate
information obtained in one proceeding into in his or her
deliberations of the arbitration award.

Thus , a separate

entity should act as a conciliator and arbitration .
ARBITRATION SUB- COMMISSIONS
The CIETAC Arbitration Rules also gives the
Arbitration Commission , whose headquarters are in
Beijing , the authority to create Arbitration SubCorrunissions (Sub - Corrunissions)
Barlett, LLP 2003 , A5) .

(Simpson , Thacher , &

To date , the CIETAC has only

established sub - corrunissions in Shenzhen and Shanghai
handle international and fo r eign - related arbitrations.
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The sub - commissions are , in theory , considered "'an
integral part of the arbitration commission ' "
Moser , & Wang 2000, 37) .

(Dejun ,

But it is debatable whether the

Arbitration Commission in Beijing can effectively monitor
the arbitration commissions in different Chinese
provinces .

It is argued that the local or arbitration

sub - commissions should have the capacity to monitor the
arbitration proceedings within that province .

However,

as we can see in the Chinese legal system , the
implementation of laws , rules , and regulations may vary

from province to province .

CHAPTER VI
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
The Chinese Arbitration Law does not contain a
provision regarding the enforcement or enforceability of
Instead it relies on the

foreign arbitration awards .

Chinese Civil Procedure Law (Claver - Carone 2002, 380;
Dejun , Moser, & Wang 2000 ,

28)_.

Article 206 of the 1991

Chinese Civil Procedure Law states that the People ' s
Court may refuse enforcement of an arbitral award if a
party presents evidence that :
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(1) the parties neither included an arbitration
clause in there contract nor subsequently reached a
written arbitration agreement ; (2) the party against
whom the application for enforcement is sought was
not requested to appoint an arbitrator or to take
part in the arbitration proceedings or such party
was unable to present its case due to reasons for
which it was not responsible ; (3) the composition of
the arbitral tribunal or the arbitration procedure
was not in conformity with the applicable rules of
arbitration ; or (4) the matters decided in the award
e xceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement or
fell outside the competence of the arbitration
organization .
(Dejun , Moser , & Wang 2000 , 28 ; Liu & Lourie 1995 , 551;
Fishburne 1997 , 229 - 230 ; Harpole 1998) .
Such grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitral award
mirrors the grounds states within Article V, Sections 1
and 2 of the New York Convention (Harpole 1998) .

In

theory Chinese arbitration systems should enforce
arbitration awards outside these elements .
A party seeking to enforce or set aside an arbitral
award under the Article 206 of the Chinese Civil
Procedure Law must first file a claim with the
Intermediate People ' s Court (IPC)

(Fishburne 1997, 333).

Once the IPC has refused to enforce a foreign arbitration
award rendered by the CIETAC or CMAC , the

p~rty

must

either request a new arbitration or file an action wi t hin
the Supreme People ' s Court (SPC)
551).

(Liu & Lourie 1995,

The SPC may rule that the foreign arbitral award
3b

should be enforced .

However , the SPC, as described

above , does not have any authority to force parties to
abide by this decision .

Thus , parties may either ignore

the SPC ' s decision altogether or take an indefinite time
to abide by the court ' s decision .
SOCIAL AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
Chinese courts may also refuse to enforce
arbitration awards if it is inconsistent with 'social and
public interests '

(Claver- Carone 2002 , 398).

This is

commonly referred to as the public policy e x ception.
This public policy exception is quite vague , and the
standard for applying this public policy exception may
vary from case - to-case (Claver - Carone 2002 , 400) .

CHAPTER VII
LOCAL PROTECTIONISM
THE HISTORY OF LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE PRC
The term ' local protectionism' was associated with
the PRC in the late 1980s .

This is when reports of the

internal trade barriers were prevalent throughout the PRC
(Rawski 2005 , last visited Mar. 13 , 2005) .

The term

local protectionism is not limited to economic or
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microeconomic problems.

Instead, local protectionism

also describes policy implementation problems, the
judicial integrity and enforcement (Rawski 2005, last
visited Mar. 15, 2005).
Local protectionism in Chinese courts affects the
integrity of judicial officials and the enforceability of
judicial awards.

"Local protectionism in judicial

affairs can be defined in two ways. In the narrow sense,
it refers to the practice of a local court being partial
to and siding with a local litigant in handling a case
that involves litigants from two different localities"
(Yang last visited Mar. 13, 2005}.

As a result, there

have been significant problems with courts enforcing
arbitration awards against local Chinese parties or
entities.
Even if Chinese courts rule to enforce an
arbitration award, local protectionism among local
governmental officials prevent the implementation of such
rulings.

Official statistics indicate that between 1995

and 1998, alone, the Chinese courts reported that in
approximately 3,473 cases, there was a

re~usal

to comply

with the court's ruling (Yang last visited Mar 13, 2005).
Over 2,378 police officers, which responded to this
problem, were wounded during their attempts to make the

38

parties comply with the court ' s ruling .

Four of these

officers were actually killed (Yang last visited Mar . 13 ,
2005) .

" At the end of June 1999 , some 850,000 court

rulings with a face value of more than 259 billion yuan
awaited execution"

(Yang last visited Mar . 13 , 2005) .

LOCAL PROTECTIONISM IS A PROBLEM FOR ARBITRATIONS
Although there are arbitration rules and the
Arbitration Commission that dictate arbitration
proceedings (Dejun 2000 , 23) , there is still a problem
with local protectionism (difang baohu zhuyi) throughout
Chinese arbitration systems.

Local protectionism is

commonly found when foreign part i es try to enforce an
arbitration award against a Chinese or Chinese-based
party (Peerenboom 2001, China Review) .

Since Chinese

arbitration systems do not have the power to force
parties to adhere to its arbitration awards or rulings,
parties must seek the assistance of Chinese courts .
Unfortunately , Chinese courts and local governmental
officials often refuse to enforce such awards because of
local ties and personal interests with local Chinese
entities (Peerenboom 2001 , 215) .
Since the local government in the PRC has a
substantial influence on the enforceability of judicial
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and arbitral awards their unwillingness to enforce such
awards is critical .

This is because local governmental

officials are often appointed to serve as judicial
officers or have ties to the government (Yang last
visited Mar . 13 , 2005).

Local governments are often

unwilling to enforce judicial and arbitration awards by
foreign parties because they seek to protect the ties
that they have with a local entity or party (Lee 2004 ,
984 - 985) .
Local protectionism enables the local government to
side with Chinese parties because they have a stake in
the survival of the local entity .

As we acknowledge the

downfalls of local protectionism within the PRC , we must
also examine how the PRC is attempting to remedy this
problem .

With the challenge to local protectionism, the

PRC has moved towards regional specializations (Bai & Tao
last visited Mar . 13 , .2005) .
Since the local government in the PRC has a
substantial influence on the enforceability of judicial
and arbitral awards their unwillingness to enforce such
awards is critical.

This is becau s e local governmental

officials are often appointed to serve as judicial
officers or have ties to the government (Yang last
visited Mar . 13 , 2005) .

Local governments , thus , are
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unwilling to enforce judicial and arbitration awards by
foreign parties because they seek to protect the ties
that they have with a local entity or party (Lee 2004 ,
984-985) .

Local protectionism enables the local government to
side with Chinese parties because they have a stake in
the survival of the local entity .

As we acknowledge the

downfalls of local protectionism , we must also examine
the PRC's attempts to prevent local protectionism from
spreading from the Chinese judiciary to its arbitration
systems.

The Chinese Arbitration Law attempts to curtail

local protectionism from spreading from the Chinese
judiciary to the PRC ' s arbitration systems .

"Article 8

of the [Chinese Arbitration} Law requires that
arbitration should be conducted independently , according
to the law and free from any interference from the
administrative authorities , social organizations or
individuals" (Beaumont 1995 , 22) .
Despite the proclamation of independence in the
Chinese Arbitration Act , it is debatable whether such
autonomy exists in the Chinese legal and arqitration
systems.

The Chinese arbitration system, like the

Chinese courts, suffers from local protectionism (Harer
1999 , 394).

Yet , local protectionism is only one
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obstacle in which foreign parties must face when seeking
to enforce an arbitration award against a Chinese party
(Peerenbom 2001 , 279) .

Parties must also consider

procedural problems that may affect the enforceability of
the arbitration award .

CHAPTER VIII
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
There may be procedural problems that foreign or
international parties may face when they attempt to
enforce or appeal an adverse arbitration award against a
Chinese or China-based party.

A common procedural

problem one may face in arbitration is that the parties '
lacked notice of the arbitration proceeding .

Secondly ,

the jurisdiction over .the arbitration proceeding is also
a procedural problem that parties may face .

Furthermore,

the perceived enforceability of the arbitration award is
of great importance to parties who undergo costly and

long arbitration proceedings .
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Arbitration , in theory , is an expedient and cost
efficient process .

Additionally , arbitration proceedings

are independent from other governmental bodies and
influence .
practice .

However , this is not always the case in
In the PRC , arbitration proceedings are

intertwined with the Chinese Communist Party and judicial
system .

This relationship makes it difficult for the

PRC ' s arbitration system to be completely independent .
Sequentially, this relationship also makes the PRC ' s
arbitration systems susceptible to governmental influence
and the PRC ' s corrupt culture .
The PRC ' s arbitration systems lack power to compel
parties to adhere to its arbitration awards or rulings .
Parties must rely on Chinese courts to administer justice
and enforce arbitration awards .

Chinese courts also lack

power to require parties to comply with its rulings .

So

even if Chinese courts rule that an arbitration award
should be enforce , it cannot oblige partres to follow
their judicial decisions .

Additionally , there isn ' t an

explicit speed in which a judic i al ruling must be
applied .

Thus , foreign parties are at the mercy of the
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Chinese Communist Party and local governments to apply
such rulings and arbitration awards .
Local protectionism by the Chinese Communist Party
and local governments can prevent the implementation of
arbitration awards .

Since local Chinese entities may be

affected by the implementation of a particular
arbitration award , the Chinese Communist Party and local
government indefinitely avoid implementing the
arbitration award .
As a political and legal scholar , I would advise
parties to first and foremost contractually agree to an
arbitration forum outside the PRC .

If this is not

possible , then parties should contractually agree to
establish a panel of three arbitrators to oversea the
arbitration proceeding and a separate panel to decide any
disputes arising out of the agreement to arbitrate and
jurisdictional issues.- . This will , for the most part,
ensure the neutrality of presiding arbitrators .
I also advise parties to establish a contract that
has a combination of arbitration and conciliation for
more complex international transactions .

~ There

have not

been any reported cases of corruption or governmental
influence in Chinese conciliation procedures.

However , I

would advise , as stated above , that the parties elect a
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separate panel from the Arbitration Commission to preside
over the conciliation proceedings .
Additionally , I would advise parties to research the
enforceability of prior arbitration awards with foreign
companies within the PRC .

This will give parties an

idealistic view of the poss i bility that their arbitration
awards will be enforced in the future or to contractually
agree on other methods to resolve their disputes .
Finally , parties should research Chinese
confidentiality rules and exceptions to confidentiality
in the PRC ' s alternative dispute resolution systems in
order to make sure that conciliators , presiding
arbitrators , and other Arbitration Commission members
cannot share information about the same case .

This is

important if parties seek to avoid challenges to
impartiality of arbitrators presiding over arbitration
proceedings .
Parties can avoid the hassle of either litigating in
Chinese courts or arbitrating in the PRC altogether by
engaging in settlement negotiations .
can observe parties negotiating a
assistance of Chinese courts .

In such cases, we

settlemen~

without the

Of course , with any

negotiations or settlement agreements each party usually
has to make concessions .

Such concessions may mean that
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a party will only be able to obtain a portion of what is
owed to them.

For instance, "in 70% percent of the

settlement cases, the applicant was able to recover at
least 75% of the award.

Other compromises included

accepting yuan (RMB) rather than foreign currency, or
agree to off set the amount owed against future purchases
from the respondentn (Peerenboom 2001 , 281).
Ultimately parties must be aware that corruption,
local protectionism, ineffective procedures, and
governmental influence may impede on international
arbitration's ultimate goal - of providing parties a
fair, reliable, and effective alternative to litigation.
Parties must thus consider alternative to arbitrating in
the PRC.
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